Why a static site still needs security

A static site has no server program or database to break into, which removes many attacks. The risks that remain happen in the visitor’s browser: code that should not run, links that hijack a tab, the site shown inside someone else’s page, or private details leaking out.

Good security works in layers. No single measure is perfect, so each layer limits the damage if another one fails.

The main threats

Code injection (XSS)
Someone gets their own JavaScript to run on the site, where it could read what visitors type.
Compromised outside code
A script loaded from another company’s server is changed by an attacker, and runs on every site that loads it.
Clickjacking
Another site shows this one inside an invisible frame and tricks visitors into clicking.
Unsafe links
A page opened in a new tab takes control of the tab that opened it.
Leaking information
Private files, internal notes or hidden data inside images end up public.
Form abuse
Bots fill a contact form with spam.

Principles

How this site applies them

A strict security policy
A Content-Security-Policy header tells browsers to run only this site’s own scripts, plus five inline scripts identified by fingerprints of their exact text. Injected code has a different fingerprint and is refused.
Text, never code
All content is inserted with textContent, never innerHTML, and the generated pages escape every character that could start a tag.
Safe links
Links must start with # or https://, and external ones open with rel="noopener noreferrer".
Almost no outside code
The fonts and the visit-counting script are stored on the site itself. The one exception is the contact form’s “I am human” check (hCaptcha): it loads only when a visitor nears the form, and the policy names its address only for that check.
No framing
frame-ancestors none and X-Frame-Options DENY stop other sites from showing this one in a frame.
Private files stay private
Tests, tools and internal notes are kept off the live site by a .vercelignore file.
Hidden image data removed
Eight screenshots carried phone metadata: a build number, capture times and image ids, though no location. A small tool removed it without changing the pictures, and a test now fails if any image carries it.

Proving it

The defences are tested, not trusted: a script injected into the page is blocked, markup planted in the data file appears as harmless text on the generated pages, and a javascript: link is dropped. Every page is tested under the real policy, and no violation is allowed.

The known gap, and its fix

The contact form’s spam checks ran only in the visitor’s browser, and its access key is public by design, so a bot could send messages to the service directly. The fix is a captcha: the form now sends a one-time proof from hCaptcha with each message. The gap closes only once the form service is told to refuse messages without that proof, and until then it stays open. Writing the gap down is part of the security work.